Why states go to war over barren deserts, remote islands, and uninhabited plateaus
Princeton University Press, Series in International Politics and History (expected July 2027)
Why are states more likely to fight over barren, seemingly worthless territory than land rich in oil, minerals, or other economic resources? More broadly, why are states and their citizens willing to support such conflicts when they could be fighting for something with more tangible worth? In What States Fight For, Soyoung Lee debunks the conventional view that greater economic value means greater national interest and greater international significance. She argues instead that what matters is not overall economic worth but who is expected to benefit. Conflicts yielding economic windfalls that reward only certain domestic groups can generate opposition over who stands to gain and invite suspicions about parochial motives. Territories with little obvious economic value, on the other hand, have no apparent domestic winners or losers. This makes it easier for leaders to attach symbolic value to the territory and frame them as benefiting the nation as a whole.
Drawing on a broad range of evidence covering two centuries of conflict, including geospatial analyses of territorial claims, archival case studies of Chile and Bolivia, survey experiments, and analyses of political rhetoric surrounding the Gulf War and the conflict in the South China Sea, Lee develops a “Diffuse Benefits Theory” of national interest. With this theoretical framework in place, she shows how having clear economic benefits can turn an issue or conflict into a political liability—while vague appeals to national honor, prestige, and greatness can prove politically effective. Lee’s account has important implications for our understanding of “resource wars” and the distributional consequences of foreign policy.